

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 3591

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MPOL, NATO, CA
SUBJECT: CANADIAN DEFENSE STRUCTURE REVIEW: FRG FOLLOW-UP PAPER

REF: A. USNATO 3519 (NOTAL)
B. STATE 156803

1. THE TEXT OF BONN'S FOLLOW-UP PAPER ON THE CANADIAN DEFENSE
STRUCTURE REVIEW FOLLOWS BELOW. THE FRG DELEGATION PROVIDED THE
PAPER TO THE CANADIAN DELEGATION ON JULY 4. THE GERMANS HAVE
REQUESTED WE ACCORD SAME PROTECTION TO THIS PAPER AS TO EARLIER
PAPER (REF A).

2. BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: GERMAN COMMENTS ON THE "CANADIAN DEFENCE
STRUCTURE REVIEW PAPER FOR CONSULATATION"
DATED 18 JUNE 1975

REFERENCES: (1) CANADIAN PAPER DATED 18 JUNE 1975
(2) CANADIAN/GERMAN DISCUSSIONS HELD IN
BRUSSELS ON 25 JUNE 1975

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A. INTRODUCTION

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WELCOMES THE FACT THAT THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN

A CANADIAN AND A GERMAN DELEGATION, HELD IN BRUSSELS AT THE OFFICE OF THE CANADIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO ON 25 JUNE 1975, OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY OF EXPRESSING ONCE MORE IN DETAIL ITS POSITION ON THE CANADIAN OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE COMPOSITION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES STATIONED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

THE DISCUSSION FOLLOWED THE LINES AGREED BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND FEDERAL CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN BRUSSELS AND BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE LEBER IN OTTAWA AND WERE CHAIRED BY THE TWO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ASSISTED BY MILITARY EXPERTS FROM THE RESPECTIVE MINISTRIES OF DEFENCE.

2. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE BASED ON

A) THE DOCUMENT "CANADIAN DEFENCE STRUCTURE REVIEW PAPER FOR CONSULTATION", TRANSMITTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE GERMAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON 18 JUNE 1975;

B) THE PRELIMINARY GERMAN COMMENTS ON THAT DOCUMENT, TRANSMITTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE CANADIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON 24 JUNE 1975 AND ENTITLED "COMMENTS ON THE CANADIAN PAPER DATED 18 JUNE 1975 ON CANADIAN DEFENCE STRUCTURE REVIEW".

3. THE CANADIAN PAPER FOR CONSULTATION OF 18 JUNE 1975, REFERRING TO THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF CANADA'S CURRENT DEFENCE POLICY AND THE RESULTANT FOUR PRIORITY ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES, CONCENTRATED ON CONCEPTUAL OPTIONS FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE AND THUS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

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IN THE LIGHT OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S STATEMENT IN BRUSSELS THAT CANADA WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A NATO FORCE LEVEL ACCEPTED BY ITS ALLIES AS BEING ADEQUATE IN SIZE AND EFFECTIVE IN CHARACTER, THE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONFINED TO THE FUTURE STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

BOTH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GERMAN DELEGATION ASSUMED THAT CANADA WOULD CONTINUE TO MEET ITS OTHER NATO COMMITMENTS AND DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE THE COMPOSITION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY DEPENDENT ON ANY OTHER

COMMITMENTS THEY HAD TO MEET.

4. FURTHERMORE, THE GERMAN DELEGATION TOOK PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WAS INTERESTED IN LEARNING INITIALLY THE GERMAN POSITION REGARDING THE ENVISAGED OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF FACILITATING ITS OWN DECISION-MAKING, BUT THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE NEITHER A SUBSTITUTE FOR ANY CONSULTATIONS IN THE COMPETENT NATO BODIES WHICH MIGHT BECOME NECESSARY, NOR WOULD THEY PREJUDICE THE RESULTS OF SUCH CONSULTATIONS.

5. DURING THE RUSSELS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CANADIAN OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES COULD BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A) OPTION A:

CONTINUATION OF THE GROUND AND AIR FORCE ELEMENTS WITH THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES

(1) FOR THE GROUND FORCES:

(A) RETENTION OF THE ARMOURED ELEMENT,
REPLACING OR MODERNIZING THE CENTURION
TANK;

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(B) DISBANDING THE CANADIAN TANK BATTALION
AND REPLACING IT BY A FOREIGN TANK
BATTALION UNDER CANADIAN COMMAND;

(C) REPLACEMENT OF THE CENTURION BY A
FOREIGN TANK ON A LOAN BASIS AND
MANNED BY CANADIAN CREWS;

(D) REPLACEMENT OF THE CENTURION BY A
LIGHT TRACKED DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT VEHICLE;

(E) CONVERTING THE CANADIAN MECHANIZED BRIGADE
GROUP (CMBG) INTO AN ANTITANK FORMATION;

(F) CONVERTING THE CMBG INTO AN AIR MOBILE FORMATION
WITH ATTACK HELICOPTERS.

IN SUMMARY, ALTERNATIVES (A) TO (C) PROVIDE FOR THE RETENTION OF A TANK BATTALION IN NO. 4 CMBG, ALTERNATIVES (D) TO (F) FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE TANK BATTALION.

(2) AIR FORCE COMPONENT

IN ALL OF THE 6 ALTERNATIVES, THE CF 104 OF THE AIR
FORCES WILL BE REPLACED BY AN AIR ATTACK/AIR DEFENCE
AIRCRAFT FROM 1980 ONWARDS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 3591

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B) OPTION B:

LAND FORCES ONLY, WITH REINFORCEMENT OF THE CMBG INTO
A FULL-STRENGTH BRIGADE WITH THE SAME 6 ALTERNATIVES
AS IN OPTION A.

C) OPTION C:

AIR FORCES ONLY, INCLUDING THE REINFORCEMENT BY ONE OR
MORE SQUADRONS AND REPLACEMENT OF THE CF 104 BY AN
ATTACK/AIR DEFENCE AIRCRAFT.

6. ON THE BASIS OF THE PRELIMINARY COMMENTS OF 24 JUNE 1975, AND
WITH REFERENCE TO THE ARGUMENTS FORWARDED IN THE DISCUSSIONS
ON 25 JUNE 1975 THE GERMAN COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE OPTIONS
ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

B. GERMAN COMMENTS ON THE CANADIAN OPTIONS

7. SECURITY POLICY ASPECTS

A) THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE TASKS TO BE PERFORMED BY THE CANADIAN FORCES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF CANADA, WITHIN THE ALLIANCE,
AND IN RELATION WITH THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC ATTACHES THE HIGHEST VALUE TO
CANADA'S ROLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. IF CANADIAN DEFENCE

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EFFORTS WERE TO BE CONCENTRATED EVEN MORE ON THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST, THIS WOULD NOT BE COMMENSURATE WITH THIS ROLE. MOREOVER, ANY CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A REDUCTION WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OTHER ALLIES WHO HAVE A HEAVIER ECONOMIC BURDEN TO CARRY.

B) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ATTACHES HIGH POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE TO THE OVERALL CANADIAN CONTINGENT AND ITS PEACETIME STATIONING IN THE FRG. THE PRESENCE OF THE CANADIAN FORCES IN GERMANY DEMONSTRATES THE TRANSATLANTIC TIES LINKING THE NATO ALLES. FAR FROM BEING OF SYMBOLICAL VALUE ONLY, THE STATIONING OF THESE FORCES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF DETERRENCE AND THUS OF THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE. BOTH FACTORS ARE BASED TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF MILITARY FORCES OF THE TWO NORTH-AMERICAN ALLIES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

C) TO BOTH THE ALLIES AND A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR, THE CANADIAN FORCES IN GERMANY ARE THE VISIBLE PROOF OF ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY. AS SUCH, THEY ARE FIRMLY ROOTED IN THE MINDS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, IN PARTICULAR IN THE AREA WHERE THEY ARE STATIONED. FOLLOWING THE REDUCTION OF CANADIAN TROOPS IN 1970, ANY STEP THAT COULD BE REGARDED AS CONDUCIVE TO A FURTHER WEAKENING OF CANADA'S DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION WOULD MEET WITH SEVEREST CRITICISM. ANY SUCH STEP

- WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE WARSAW PACT AS AN INDICATION OF THE EROSION OF THE TRANS-ATLANTIC TIES;

- WOULD UNDERMINE THE WESTERN POSITION WITH REGARD TO MBFR;

- WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE EUROPEAN ALLIES

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AS REDUCING THE TRANSATLANTIC TIES MORE OR LESS TO THE ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES;

- WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION AND WOULD ENCUMBER THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AIMED AT MAINTAINING

THE GERMAN DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION AT ITS PRESENT
LEVEL.

D) IN THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE IT IS INDISPENSABLE
FOR REASONS OF SECURITY POLICY ALONE THAT THE
CANADIAN FORCES STATIONED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
RETAIN THEIR CHARACTER OF AN AUTONOMOUS CANADIAN
CONTINGENT BY VIRTUE OF THEIR SIZE, STRUCTURE,
EQUIPMENT AND CAPABILITIES.

THIS ALONE WILL ENSURE THAT THE FOLLOWING WILL
CONTINUE TO BE UNDIMINISHED IN EVIDENCE:

- THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF CANADIAN TROOPS IN EUROPE,
- THE MULTINATIONAL MILITARY INTEGRATION IN
EUROPE, INCLUDING CANADIAN PARTICIPATION;
- THE CANADIAN COMMITMENT TO DETERRENCE THROUGH
SOLIDARITY WITHIN NATO, AND THE HOPE FOR THE
PRESERVATION OF PEACE BASED ON THAT DETERRENCE.

8. GENERAL MILITARY ASPECTS

A) IN VIEW OF THE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
PROGRESSIVE EXPANSION OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY
STRENGTH, THE NEW MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE OF 1975
PLACES PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
STRONG, IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, COMBAT-READY
CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE FOR THE IMPLEMENT-
ATION OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF FLEXIBLE
RESPONSE AS LAID DOWN IN MC 14/3. ANY REDUCTION
OF THE COMBAT-READY CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD
BE CONTRARY TO THE BASIC TREND OF THE MINISTERIAL
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GUIDANCE, DIMINISH THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE,
AND INCREASE THE RISK OF AN EARLY RESORT TO THE
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

B) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS THE MOST
EXPOSED COUNTRY IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THUS THE
COUNTRY RUNNING THE GREATEST RISK IN CASE OF
A WP AGGRESSION. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC ACCEEDED
TO NATO BECAUSE IT IS NOT ABLE BY ITSELF TO
SAFEGUARD ITS EXTERNAL SECURITY. MAKING ITS DUE
CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE, IT TRUSTS AT THE
SAME TIME THAT ITS PARTNERS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE
WILL MAINTAIN AND CONTINUE THE SHARE IN
CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEFENCE WHICH THEY HAVE UNDER-
TAKEN TO CONTRIBUTE. THEREFORE, THE GERMAN

PUBLIC WOULD FEEL DISILLUSIONED BY ANY REDUCTION
OF THE CANADIAN TROOPS STATIONED IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC.

C) OWING TO THEIR HIGH PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION
AND THEIR RELIABILITY, THE CANADIAN TROOPS, BOTH
THE GROUND AND AIR FORCE ELEMENTS, ARE HIGHLY
RESPECTED IN GERMANY. IN PARTICULAR THE GERMAN
FORCES COOPERATING WITH THE CANADIAN FORCES
AND KNOWING THEIR OUTSTANDING QUALITY BY
EXPERIENCE, WOULD REGARD ANY REDUCTION OF THE
CANADIAN TROOPS STATIONED IN GERMANY AS A
LAMENTABLE LOSS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 USNATO 3591

EXDIS

D) THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENSE STATED IN MC 14/3,
UNDERLINED AS ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE IN THE AD 70
STUDY, AND REEMPHASIZED IN THE 1975 MINISTERIAL
GUIDANCE, IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BECAUSE OF ITS GEOGRAPHICAL
SITUATION. WITH ITS BORDER TO THE WARSAW PACT
COUNTRIES EXTENDING ALMOST 1000 KM FROM NORTH
TO SOUTH, AND WITH A DEPTH OF 200 KM ONLY FROM
THE BORDER IN THE EAST TO THE RHINE RIVER IN
THE WEST, EVEN MINOR TERRITORIAL LOSSES IN CASE
OF AN AGGRESSION WOULD MEAN GIVING UP ABOUT
ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL POPULATION AND SUCH
IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL CENTERS AS HAMBURG,
HANNOVER, KASSEL, BAMBERG, WURZBURG, NURNBERG,
AND REGENSBURG. THEREFORE, IT IS OF PARTICULAR
IMPORTANCE TO HAVE STRONG COMBAT-READY FORCES
IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE NEAR THE BORDER, FORCES
THAT ARE CAPABLE OF ENSURING AN EFFECTIVE
DEFENCE EVEN IN CASE OF A SURPRISE ATTACK.

AIR FORCES ALONE ARE NOT ABLE TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF FORWARD DEFENCE. ALTHOUGH THEY CAN INFLICT CONSIDERABLE LOSSES TO AN ATTACKER, THEY CANNOT PREVENT HIM FROM SEIZING TERRITORY BY CONVENTIONAL MEANS. TO DO SO, GROUND FORCES ARE REQUIRED.

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FOR THIS VERY REASON THE RETENTION OF THE GROUND FORCE ELEMENT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES IS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

E) THE DEFENCE OF THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, HOWEVER, REQUIRES THE EMPLOYMENT OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN CONCERT. IN CASE OF AN AGGRESSION THAT IS LAUNCHED EITHER BY SURPRISE OR WITH LITTLE WARNING, AIR FORCES CAN REACT FASTER THAN GROUND FORCES. THEY ARE ABLE TO DELAY THE PENETRATION OF THE ENEMY'S LEADING ELEMENTS SO LONG AS TO PERMIT FRIENDLY GROUND FORCES TO DEPLOY TO THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ALL THE SAME AND TO START THEIR DEFENCE NEAR THE EASTERN BORDER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

F) THE ABOVE-MENTIONED REASONS SHOW CLEARLY THAT AS FAR AS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS CONCERNED THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE RETENTION OF AN AUTONOMOUS CANADIAN CONTINGENT COMPRISING BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCE ELEMENTS.

9. OPTION C

THE CONVERSION OF CANADA'S FORCE CONTRIBUTION IN EUROPE INTO A MERE AIR FORCE ELEMENT IS IN NO WAY RECONCILABLE WITH THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. THEREFORE, OPTION C IS INACCEPTABLE TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUND FORCES, AND IN VIEW OF THE HIGHER MOBILITY OF AIR FORCES, A DUAL BASING OF THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE ELEMENT WOULD BE RATHER MORE ACCEPTABLE.

HOWEVER, THE STATEMENTS OF AIR FORCE EXPERTS IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF 25 JUNE 1975 HAVE MADE IT SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR THAT EVEN THIS ALTERNATIVE IS NOT VERY EXPEDIENT FOR REASONS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS.

10. OPTION B

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IT IS TRUE THAT THE OPTION PROVIDING FOR GROUND FORCES ONLY, INCLUDING THE REINFORCEMENT OF NO. 4 CBMG TO A FULL-STRENGTH BRIGADE, WOULD OFFER CERTAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGES OVER OPTION C IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING SHORTAGE OF GROUND FORCES IN THE CENTAG AREA.

EVEN SO, THE OVERALL DISADVANTAGES OF THIS OPTION, AGAIN, ARE GREATER:

A) ELIMINATION OF THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE ELEMENT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTION AND WOULD THUS HAVE THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ADVERSE EFFECTS (OF. PARAS 7 AND 8).

B) OVER AND ABOVE THE FACT THAT THE RELATIVE FORCE CAPABILITIES OF THE AIR FORCES ARE EVEN NOW UNFAVOURABLE TO NATO, 4ATAF WOULD LOSE A RELIABLE CORE OF WELL-TRAINED, EFFICIENT SQUADRONS AND AIRCRAFT. IN CASE OF A SURPRISE ATTACK, THEIR MISSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE REASSIGNED TO OTHER AIR FORCES WHICH ARE, HOWEVER, UNABLE TO ASSUME ADDITIONAL TASKS. IN CASE OF A TACTICAL CRISIS, THE AVAILABILITY OF THREE SQUADRONS MORE OR LESS MAY WELL BE A MATTER OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.

C) AS FAR AS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS CONCERNED, THE ABOVE REASONS ARE ALSO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE "GROUND FORCES ONLY" OPTION.

11. OPTION A

A) GERMANY CONSIDERS THAT ALL OF THE ARGUMENTS LISTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS ARE DEFINITELY IN FAVOUR OF OPTION A, I.E. RETENTION OF A CONTINGENT COMPRISING BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCE ELEMENTS.

B) THE ELIMINATION OF THE TANK BATTALION FROM THE GROUND FORCE ELEMENT, I.E. NO. 4 CMBG, WOULD
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LEAVE THE LATTER INCAPABLE OF EXECUTING ITS PRESENT MISSION AS AUTONOMOUS CENTAG RESERVE. ELEMENTS WHOSE CAPABILITY IS CONFINED TO CONTAINING THE AGGRESSOR AND WHICH HAVE TO DO WITHOUT MAIN BATTLE TANKS CANNOT MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE DEFENCE. SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE REQUIRES THE CAPABI-

LITY OF EMPLOYING THE AVAILABLE TROOPS ACTIVELY
IN MOBILE OPERATIONS AND EVEN FOR COUNTERATTACKS
TO THREATEN THE ATTACKER'S FLANKS AND EXPLOIT
GAPS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE ENEMY BY SUCH COUNTER-
ATTACK. WITHOUT MAIN BATTLE TANKS, NO.4 CMBG
WOULD RESEMBLE A BOXER WHO, FIGHTING A STRONG
OPPONENT, IS ONLY ALLOWED TO BLOCK, BUT NOT TO
HIT.

C) RE OPTION A 1 B

IF THE WITHDRAWN CANADIAN MAIN BATTLE TANKS WERE
REPLACED BY A TANK BATTALION OF ANOTHER NATION,
THAT BATTALION WOULD HAVE TO BE PERMANENTLY AS-
SIGNED TO THE CANADIAN FORCES NOT ONLY IN WARTIME,
BUT ALSO FOR PEACETIME TRAINING AND EXERCISES.
THERE IS NO TANK BATTALION AVAILABLE FOR THESE
PURPOSES. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN ELSE-
WHERE AND WOULD LEAVE A GAP THAT COULD NOT BE
FILLED.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 3591

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D) RE OPTION A 1 D

CONVERSION OF THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT INTO A
LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE FORMATION WOULD BE EQUALLY
DISASTROUS BECAUSE OF THE RESULTANT LACK OF MAIN
BATTLE TANKS. IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN ENVIRON-
MENT AND IN OPERATIONS AGAINST AN ARMOUR-HEAVY
ENEMY, RECONNAISSANCE MUST BE AGGRESSIVE. THIS
REQUIRES MAIN BATTLE TANKS. AS TO THE OPERA-
TIONAL USE OF A LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE FORMATION,
COMCENTAG AND SACEUR MADE NEGATIVE COMMENTS AS
EARLY AS IN 1973.

E) RE OPTION A 1 E

THE PRESENT MISSION OF NO.4 CMBG IS TO OPERATE AS A CENTAG RESERVE, MOUNTING COUNTERATTACKS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COMBAT SECTOR OF THE II (GE) CORPS AND OVER THE ENTIRE COMBAT SECTOR OF THE VII (US) CORPS OR TO CONTAIN ENEMY PENETRATIONS IN THE DESCRIBED AREA. SINCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FRENCH TROOPS, THE COMBAT SECTORS OF THE TWO CORPS HAVE BEEN OVEREXTENDED AND THEIR AVAILABLE RESERVES WEAK. IN ALL PROBABILITY, THE ATTACKER WILL NOT ONLY BE SUPERIOR IN NUMBERS, BUT FULLY MECHANIZED AND ARMOUR-HEAVY. THEREFORE, THE RESERVES MUST BE HIGHLY MOBILE, CAPABLE OF FIGHT-
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ING MECHANIZED FORCES AND MAKING COUNTERATTACKS AGAINST WEAK SPOTS OF THE ENEMY, AND THE LACK OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS MUST NOT LIMIT THEIR CAPABILITY PER SE TO CONTAINING MISSIONS. ANY FURTHER WEAKENING OF THE RESERVES COMMITTED IN THE CENTAG AREA BY REDUCTION OR WITHDRAWAL OF THE MAIN BATTLE TANKS WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL.

IN THE OPINION OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, ANOTHER FACT OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IS THAT THE NO.4 CMBG WOULD NO LONGER BE CAPABLE OF BEING EMPLOYED INDEPENDENTLY AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF ITS MAIN BATTLE TANKS. IT COULD BE ATTACHED TO THE II (GE) CORPS AS CORPS ANTITANK FORMATION. BUT SINCE THIS WOULD RAISE CONSIDERABLE LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTIES, ATTACHMENT TO THE VII (US) CORPS WOULD BE THE OBVIOUS SOLUTION. IN COMBAT OPERATIONS THE RESPECTIVE CORPS WOULD HAVE TO ATTACH NO.4 CMBG TO ONE OF ITS DIVISIONS, REATTACHING IT PERHAPS TO ONE OF THEIR BRIGADES, DEPENDING ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION. THUS, THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT WITH ITS HIGH SECURITY POLICY VALUE WOULD BE LESS IN EVIDENCE EVEN IN PEACETIME PLANNING, AND HENCE IN EXERCISES, OWING TO ITS ATTACHMENT TO A SUBORDINATE GERMAN OR US UNIT. EVEN IN INTEGRATED DEFENCE, THE PRESERVATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY WILL PROBABLY MAKE IT EASIER TO THE YOUNG GENERATION, IN PARTICULAR THOSE SERVING IN THE ARMED FORCES, TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WITH NATO DEFENCE.

F) RE OPTION 1 A F

IN CASE OF CONVERSION OF THE CMBG INTO AN AIR MOBILE FORMATION, GERMANY FEELS THAT AGAIN THOSE PROBLEMS WOULD ARISE WHICH ARE BOUND TO RESULT FROM THE

LACK OF A COMPLEMENTARY MECHANIZED ELEMENT. THE COST FOR AN AIR MOBILE FORMATION WOULD, MOREOVER, BE CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THAT OF A MECHANIZED ELEMENT OF COMPARABLE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

G) IN GERMAN OPINION, ONLY OPTIONS A 1 A AND C ARE CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMENSURATE WITH THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENCE OF THE ALLIANCE. TO EQUIP THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT WITH LEOPARD TYPE TANKS ON A LOAN BASIS WOULD RAISE CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS WHOSE FINAL SOLUTION IS NOT YET FULLY FORESEEABLE. COSTS AMOUNTING TO ABOUT 180 000,-- DM PER TANK AND YEAR MUST BE EXPECTED. IMPORTANT QUESTIONS (SUCH AS PREFINANCING, LEGAL PROBLEMS) REMAIN TO BE ANSWERED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MILITARY AND FINANCIAL BENEFITS FROM THE USE OF A COMMON LOGISTIC BASE AND THE SHARING OF TRAINING FACILITIES, INCLUDING SHILE, SHOULD WEIGH HEAVILY.

12. SPECIALIZATION

THE GERMAN COMMENTS WERE PREPARED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF SPECIALIZATION IN MIND.

A) SPECIALIZATION ON THE GROUND FORCE MISSION (OPTION B) WOULD FAIL TO ACHIEVE ONE ESSENTIAL GOAL OF SPECIALIZATION, NAMELY COST-SAVING, IF THE WITHDRAWN AIR FORCES WERE DUAL BASED.

B) SPECIALIZATION ON THE AIR FORCE MISSION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC FOR THE ABOVE-MENTIONED REASONS.

C) WITHIN THE GROUND FORCES, OPERATIONAL REASONS (OF. PARAS 11 C - G) MAKE IT APPEAR NECESSARY AND MORE REASONABLE TO PURSUE RATIONALIZATION THROUGH STANDARDIZATION RATHER THAN THROUGH SPECIALIZATION.

D) IN VIEW OF THE MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO, AND THE COMPOSITION OF, THE FORCES AVAILABLE TO CENTAG/4 ATAF, SPECIALIZATION ON ONE OF THE TWO ELEMENTS (GROUND OR AIR FORCE) WOULD, MOREOVER, REQUIRE THE MISSIONS HAVING BEEN ASSIGNED TO CANADA TO BE REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER NATION AT SHORT NOTICE. THERE ARE NOWHERE ANY ADDITIONAL FORCES THAT COULD TAKE OVER THOSE MISSIONS.

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C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW

13. OPTION C, BUT OPTION B AS WELL, WOULD DEGRADE THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY VALUE OF THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO DETERRENCE, PEACEKEEPING, AND DEFENCE OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

OPTION A, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS FULLY IN LINE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR ENSURING AN EFFECTIVE, INTEGRATED, COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.

14. WITHIN OPTION A, THE ALTERNATIVES D TO F, WHICH DO NOT PROVIDE FOR MAIN BATTLE TANKS, AFFECT THE UNLIMITED USE OF NO.4 CMBG, RESTRICTING ITS ROLE AS CENTAG RESERVE, AND WOULD PRESUMABLY RESULT IN NO.4 CMBG BEING EARLY ATTACHED TO ONE OF THE SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS OF THE II (GE) OR VII (US) CORPS. ALTERNATIVE B WILL PROBABLY NOT BE FEASIBLE.

15. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD, THEREFORE, BE GRATEFUL, IF CONSIDERATIONS ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE WERE BASED EITHER ON OPTION A 1 A OR ON OPTION A 1 C.

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